The extensive hearings of the inquiry into failings of care at Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust give perhaps the most intimate insight into the workings of the modern NHS yet glimpsed by outsiders-but it makes for dismal reading.
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Over the course of the public inquiry, the importance attached to these HSMRs would become a central source of contention. But the inquiry also uncovered many other warning signs that went seemingly unheeded.
On 3 August 2001 the chief executive of the south western Staffordshire PCT warned that Stafford hospital's leadership was not competent and that this had an "impact on patient care" 2 3 By January 2002, a clinical governance review by the Commission for Health Improvement, the now defunct NHS government watchdog, noted "urgent action required." It had a range of concerns, including emergency admissions, staff training, and complaints. 4 Little more than a year later, and this time the concern centred on care of critically ill or injured children. A peer review visit on 20 May 2003 identified that the trust had not met several of the standards relating to medical and nurse staffing in emergency departments and was relatively unresponsive to the review and lacking in insight. 5 And in July 2004, the Healthcare Commission gave the trust a no star rating.
From 2005 the trusts, strategic health authority (SHA), and primary care trust (PCT) were using Dr Foster's real time monitoring system. Up to March 2009 staff logged on 8000 times, when they would have seen the mortality alerts and HSMRs on the default opening screen.
On 11 January 2006, the trust's care of critically ill and critically injured children was examined again for the West Midlands NHS Specialised Services Commissioning Group. A letter to the trust set out a number of "immediate risks to clinical safety or clinical outcomes." 6 The Healthcare Commission national staff survey for 2006 showed that less than half of staff at Mid Staffs said that they were happy with the care at the trust. In several areas, such as "were there enough nurses on duty to care for you," it was in the worst performing 20% of NHS trusts in England. 7 In the 2007 patient survey only five of 454 asked said "yes" to the question "were you ever asked to give your views of the quality of your care." 8 In March 2007, Dr Val Suarez, the trust's newly appointed medical director, asked the Royal College of Surgeons to review the hospital's colorectal and laparoscopic cholecystectomy service because of longstanding complaints and concerns. She told the inquiry that it was unlikely that the South Staffordshire PCT or West Midlands SHA "would have been aware of the review." 9 The college did not follow-up to confirm that the recommendations from its 2007 review had been implemented.
The college conducted a second review in 2009, and its report found serious concerns with the cases of four of the five surgeons in the colorectal department and referred to the trust providing "grossly negligent" care.
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Questions over figures
When the Dr Foster good hospital guide was published in the Telegraph newspaper in April 2007 Mid Staffs' HSMR was 127-one of the highest in the country. There was consternation at the trust. They were expecting an HSMR of 114. On 8 May 2007 Philip Coates, responsible for clinical governance at Stafford Hospital, sent an email headed, "Some fairly urgent advice needed" to Dr Foster Intelligence, copied to Suarez and others in the trust. It started "We have to meet our SHA to explain our mortality figures." 11 But the bad news about the trust's high mortality rates did not tarnish its bid to become a foundation trust. On 7 June 2007, just a few months after the death rates were published, the health secretary approved the bid. The Department of Health was, the inquiry was later told, seemingly unaware of the trust's high HSMRs. 12 In response to the Dr Foster report, in July 2007 the trust set up a group to look into mortality, but much of its effort was put into establishing whether the high rate was due to poor recording of clinical information. The group's findings were later relayed to the board: "coding issues (accuracy and depth) had been identified as being responsible for the high figure published and that a review by the trust showed that its SMR is within the national average range (1.5%-3%)." 13 Meanwhile, a series of mortality alerts-indications that patients may be exposed to greater than expected risk-were issued to Mid Staffs. On 3 July 2007 the Dr Foster Unit at Imperial College sent Martin Yeates, the chief executive of Mid Staffs, a mortality alert for operations on the jejunum. Over the next four months, the unit issued three further mortality alerts concerning aortic, peripheral, and visceral artery aneurysms; peritonitis and intestinal abscess; and other circulatory disease.
14 The alerts carried a 0.1% false alarm rate. The Healthcare Commission also issued three mortality alerts before November 2007.
The public inquiry heard that there was growing evidence of serious concerns in the emergency department at the same time. Chris Turner, who began work as specialist registrar at the department in October 2007, described it to the public inquiry as "an absolute disaster." 15 Staff were threatened on a near daily basis that they would lose their jobs if they did not get patients through the department within the four hour target, he claimed. The result was "significant numbers of patients in distress and, as a department, we were immune to the sound of pain." 16 In November, Julie Bailey's mother, Bella, died after spending the last weeks of her life in Stafford Hospital. The poor care her mother received prompted her to form the campaign group Cure the NHS. 17 On 23 November 2007 Helen Moss, director of nursing at Mid Staffs, wrote to Craig Watson, assessment manager at the trust regulator Monitor stating that the trust had not found any other factors besides coding to explain the high mortality rates. 18 The specific mortality alerts, sent by letter to the trust, were not made known to the assessment team either by the Healthcare Commission or by the trust despite the fact that they were effectively contemporaneous with the assessment. 19 20 On 5 December 2007 a meeting was held between Monitor and Mid Staffs for its application for foundation trust status. Monitor was told: "Our SMR is currently 101: we do not have a problem with mortality." 21 The following day the Department of Health held a meeting on foundation trusts. A note of the meeting retained by West Midlands SHA stated: "Ministers do not want any slow down of FT approvals, a slow down would be seen as the new administration going slow on NHS reform." 22 Later, as the Mid Staffs scandal unfolded in 2009 an email from John Holden, deputy director of NHS operations at the time, to Warren Brown, head of the Department of Health's foundation trust team, relayed how he and a colleague had done "a reasonable job of explaining to Ben [Bradshaw, a health minister] some of the context for the Mid Staffs decision (momentum of pipeline in a relatively weak wave of applicants, etc) and the process which led to its receiving SOS support.
"Despite this, Ben feels the concerns expressed in the supporting paperwork (especially the assessment template, which describes the application as "difficult to support") were not adequately reflected in the submission to Ministers." 
Formal investigation
Just a month after Monitor formally awarded Mid Staffs foundation status in February 2008, the Healthcare Commission launched a formal investigation into the hospital's mortality rates. The hospital's chief executive issued a press release saying, "Following identification of our systems for monitoring mortality rates as a matter of concern, we carried out our own investigation, from which we concluded that this was due to problems in the recording and coding of information about patients." promoted from West Midlands SHA to become chief executive of the NHS. They described "an overwhelming response from local people on the questions of quality of care" at Mid Staffs. "David was clearly concerned about the investigation into Mid Staffordshire." Nicholson was noted to caution them that they should "remain alive to something which was simply lobbying . . . as opposed to widespread concern." 27 Nicholson later denied this account of the meeting. Heather Wood of the Healthcare Commission wrote to Yeates in July 2008 raising concerns "in the strongest possible terms" about the role of PwC, which she states is running "in effect a parallel investigation." She expresses alarm at "the potential for confusion and distraction for staff at all levels." 30 The theory persisted that coding, not the quality of care for patients, was to blame for high mortality rates at the trust.
In August, Edward Lavelle, regulatory operations director at Monitor, emailed the chair Bill Moyes: "Bill, Just to update main points coming out of the call with PwC this morning . . . Mortality: high SMR (127) appears to be coding (25-30% due to wrong coding)."
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Reality dawns
But early in 2009, senior civil servants and politicians began to grasp the severity of the findings uncovered by the Healthcare Commission. It sent Whitehall into action mode as officials began to anticipate the fall-out from the impending report.
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There was also a dawning realisation that key staff at Mid Staffs and the SHA had moved to and from government bodies. After problems were uncovered with children's heart surgery at Bristol two paediatric cardiac specialists (Hunter and de Leval) spent a month at the unit, identified problems such as low staffing and inadequate equipment, and made recommendations. Within a year the adjusted death rate for open heart surgery in children under 1 year fell from 29% to 8% and reduced further to 4% two years later. 42 A very different story emerged over the course of the Mid Staffs inquiry, where the problems at the trust continue. Last month, Monitor concluded that the trust was financially and clinically unsustainable. 43 The inquiry also heard frank testimony about the overbearing political pressures exerted on the NHS. Three of the most powerful figures in the NHS each described the reach of politics over patient safety.
Bill Moyes, former chair of Monitor, said: "The culture of the NHS, particularly the hospital sector, I would say, is not to embarrass the minister." 44 Baroness Barbara Young of the Care Quality Commission described "huge government pressure, because the government hated the idea that-that a regulator would criticise it by dint of criticising one of the hospitals or one of the services that it was responsible for." 2009-10, telling the public inquiry that: "The impression of us all was that we would just, you know, constantly do what was meant to be the thing that Number 10 wanted or that we were all, you know, unthinkingly piling this stuff through. We weren't." 46 For the recommendations of the new Francis report to endure they will need to overcome the politics of the NHS. Scarcely believably, after all the damning coverage the trust has endured, a baby was reported to have had a dummy taped to its mouth last month at the hospital. Many relatives of those who suffered at Mid Staffs will pray that the report's recommendations are not similarly stifled.
